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1. Introduction 
Several institutions in contemporary democracies, from 
central banks to supreme courts, operate on the as-
sumption that extensive delegation of decision-making 
power to experts is appropriate and legitimate, and 
decision-making in parliaments by cabinets and other 
executive institutions is based routinely on expert ad-
vice. Citizens tend to accept decision-making on these 
terms as legitimate and place considerable trust in pro-
cedures and institutions that privilege experts and ex-
pert opinions. When they do so, this is closely connect-
ed to the belief that delegating decisions to relevant 
experts or relying on their advice will contribute to im-
proving decisions; expertise is supposed to be the “fil-
ter” that secures the “truth-sensitivity” of policies and 
legislation (Christiano, 2012). Correspondingly, if ex-
pertise fails in this function, a legitimacy problem oc-
curs: giving political power to experts may be defensi-
ble, but only on the grounds that it contributes to 
enlightening political processes and improved problem-
solving (see also Martí, 2006).  
If we care about the legitimacy of political institu-
tions, it should therefore be a research priority to in-
vestigate experts’ epistemic performance. This applies 
no less in studies of the European Union (EU): the EU’s 
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non-majoritarian institutions, with the European Com-
mission at the forefront, have used knowledge and ex-
pertise as sources of legitimacy in the absence of a direct 
electoral mandate (Moodie, 2011; Trondal, 2001). In ad-
dition to in-house expertise, the Commission now rou-
tinely consults external experts to assist in the formula-
tion and implementation of policy (Schaefer, 2002). This 
is reflected in the establishment and formalisation of an 
expert group system currently consisting of more than 
fifteen hundred groups (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008; 
Metz, 2013). It would seem a natural ambition for re-
searchers to investigate how these experts perform, giv-
en what the use of expertise in political processes is 
supposed to be good for, and the particular urgency for 
non-majoritarian institutions such as the Commission to 
show real problem-solving abilities. 
This raises the methodological question of how ex-
pert behaviour and performance can most properly be 
studied. This paper focuses on a key factor in assess-
ments of experts’ contribution to political processes, 
namely the epistemic quality of their deliberations. On 
the basis of relevant literature, the paper identifies a 
set of variables that seem vital given this focus, and al-
so discusses the real possibilities of studying epistemic 
performance variables like these in the concrete con-
text of the European Commission’s expert group sys-
tem. A review of previous research shows that the 
question of the epistemic performance of the members 
of these groups has thus far been peculiarly over-
looked. The paper lists the different data that is availa-
ble if we want to study what Commission experts do, 
and discusses the merits and limitations of this data in 
light of well-known methodological challenges in stud-
ies of elite behaviour; the access problem and the bias 
problem. However, the bigger obstacle seems to be the 
problem of epistemic asymmetry: due to their lack of 
expertise, non-experts cannot assess the epistemic 
quality of experts’ judgments and justifications directly. 
Future research and methodological discussions must 
focus more consistently on ways to get around this 
problem, since knowledge of whether EU experts be-
have as they ought to is paramount for the evaluation 
of EU institutions’ legitimacy. The paper ends by sug-
gesting some paths towards this research objective. 
The following section of the paper clarifies the con-
cept of an epistemic dimension of democratic legitima-
cy and deliberation, introduces the idea of deliberative 
systems and the normative role of expertise arrange-
ments within such systems, and identifies some prob-
lems with existing studies and approaches, given our 
specific focus on experts’ cognitive performance in po-
litical processes. The third section elaborates on four 
central variables in any assessment of the epistemic 
quality of expert deliberations, namely the degree to 
which they are 1) informed by technical expertise, 2) 
regulated by epistemically optimal respect and inclu-
sion norms, 3) focused on politically relevant and appli-
cable knowledge, and 4) approaching questions involv-
ing moral judgment and standard setting competently. 
The elaboration is theoretical and focuses on connect-
ing the variables to the idea of truth-sensitive delibera-
tions in democratic political contexts. The fourth sec-
tion shows how existing literature on the Commission’s 
expert groups has paid little attention to the question 
of how these experts perform, and discusses the possi-
bility of studying the epistemic quality of expert delib-
eration in light of access and bias problems, the prob-
lem of epistemic asymmetry, and the specific task of 
studying experts’ deliberations, given available data. 
The final section concludes and proposes some strate-
gies for future research. 
2. Political Legitimacy and Expert Performance in 
Deliberative Systems 
To be a desirable form of rule, democracy must have 
procedures with “truth-tracking” or “truth-sensitive” 
qualities that contribute to improving decisions (Chris-
tiano, 2012; Goodin, 2003; see also Estlund 1992, 1993, 
1997, 2008); a normative defence of democracy must 
refer to the intrinsic moral value of democratic proce-
dures (Lafont, 2006; Martí, 2006; Peter, 2007, 2011), 
but also to democracy’s instrumental value and how it 
is a form of rule that contributes to better outcomes. 
Mansbridge and Parkinson (2012, p. 11) have concep-
tualised this aspect of democracy as democracy’s epis-
temic dimension or “function”: “The epistemic function 
of a deliberative system is to produce preferences, 
opinions, and decisions that are appropriately in-
formed by facts and logic and are the outcome of sub-
stantive and meaningful consideration of relevant rea-
sons.” This epistemic dimension comes in addition to 
what Mansbridge and Parkinson (2012, pp. 11-12) refer 
to as the respect dimension or “ethical function” (“to 
promote mutual respect among citizens”) and the in-
clusion dimension or “democratic function” of democ-
racy (“the inclusion of multiple and plural voices, inter-
ests, concerns, and claims”).  
The understanding of the epistemic dimension of 
democracy will vary with different normative concep-
tions of democracy. A central distinction can be drawn 
between aggregative and deliberative democracy (Pe-
ter, 2011). Aggregative democracy theory regards de-
mocracy as a particular way of aggregating citizens’ in-
dividual preferences to a collective choice. The key 
aggregative mechanism is voting. Accordingly, central 
topics in studies and assessments of the epistemic di-
mension from an aggregative democracy perspective 
would be the role of “facts and logic” and considera-
tions of “relevant reasons” in voters’ belief and prefer-
ence formation - as in literature on public ignorance - 
and factors influencing the quality of the aggregative 
decision outcomes - as in the literature on Condorcet’s 
jury theorem (Estlund, 1994; Goodin, 2003; Talisse, 
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2004; Weinshall, 2003). Our point of departure in this 
paper, deliberative democracy, highlights rather “the 
importance of public discussions prior to a vote” (Pe-
ter, 2011, p. 31). Citizens’ opinions and political will are 
not considered synonymous with their private prefer-
ences, but as the transformed outcomes of processes of 
argumentation and intersubjective scrutiny (Bohman & 
Rehg, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). This raises 
the question of the epistemic quality of these processes. 
The epistemic dimension will also be more im-
portant in some settings than in others. With Mans-
bridge and Parkinson (2012) we approach the political 
process as a “deliberative system” and the epistemic, 
ethical and democracy functions as system level func-
tions. Hence, each body, arrangement or single proce-
dure within this system does not need to perform 
equally on all functions. Rather, in such systems, there 
will be a division of labour between different parts of 
the system, where a low score (for example on inclu-
sion in one sub-system, say a governmental system of 
expert advisors) can be compensated with higher score 
elsewhere (to follow the same example, by an inclusive 
parliament and civil society). Deliberative democracy 
theory would regard the epistemic dimension to also 
be significant outside expert settings (Estlund, 2008; 
Habermas, 1996; Landemore, 2011). However, given 
the division of labour within the overall deliberative 
system, and the contention that legitimate expertise is 
to serve as a cognitive quality ensuring “filter”, the ep-
istemic dimension of deliberation is key not least when 
assessing the legitimacy of expert arrangements. Argu-
ably, granting extra political power to experts is defen-
sible if, and only if, doing so contributes to better and 
more truth-sensitive decisions (see also Martí, 2006). 
To assess the epistemic quality of expert deliberation is 
thus decisive from a legitimacy perspective, and an ob-
vious, pressing task for research. 
The question we ask is what epistemic quality in 
expert deliberations would include. Our approach is 
thus procedural: we are looking for more specific epis-
temically relevant features of deliberative processes—
variables we can reasonably assume correlate with 
high epistemic quality of decisions—and not outcome-
oriented criteria meant to capture decision quality di-
rectly. We thus avoid the difficult question of what a 
“good outcome” is in this or that case. This is not to 
deny that we can have reasonable discussions about 
general standards of good outcomes (they must be in 
accordance with fair principles, the best available evi-
dence, etc.). However, to analyse the Commission’s 
expert group experts from an outcome perspective, we 
would need clear definitions of good and bad decisions 
in the myriad of cases these experts give advice on. In 
some cases where experts give projections of future 
events, researchers could check in retrospect whether 
experts were right (see for example Tetlock, 2005). 
However, the Commission’s experts are engaged in a 
range of activities other than prediction-making, such 
as providing reviews of existing research, mapping na-
tional experiences, recommending regulatory stand-
ards and schemes, etc. Moreover, expert judgments, 
even if sound, may or may not result in good decisions 
in the end, depending on the behaviour of other politi-
cal actors and policy-making bodies, as well as unpre-
dictable incidents and developments. This makes the 
quality of end results of political processes in which ex-
perts have been involved an unreliable indicator of the 
involved experts’ epistemic performance. 
Our focus more specifically will be on to the extent 
to which expert discourse is 1) influenced by technical 
expertise, 2) regulated by epistemically optimal respect 
and inclusion norms, 3) focused on politically relevant 
and applicable knowledge, and 4) approaching ques-
tions involving moral judgment and standard setting 
competently. This is not an exhaustive list of relevant 
variables, but as we will elaborate more on in the next 
section, we hold these four to be essential: if expert 
deliberations are unaffected by expert knowledge, 
regulated by norms that are detrimental to knowledge-
seeking, politically irrelevant and inapplicable, and ap-
proach non-factual, value-laden questions incompetent-
ly, there is reason to suspect that the epistemic quality 
of deliberations is poor and expert performance low. 
Deliberative democracy literature includes several 
studies of deliberative qualities. Methods applied and 
overall focus vary from questionnaires measuring the 
experience of deliberators to single case studies con-
necting the amount and characteristics of deliberation 
to policy outcomes (for a review, see Neblo, 2007). The 
problem, in particular when we are assessing expert 
discourse, is the limited attention to our variables 1) 
and 2). An illustration of this is the branch of this litera-
ture which aims to measure deliberative qualities by 
applying quantitative coding schemes to transcripts of 
deliberation (notable and often cited contributions 
here include Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, 
& Steiner, 2010; Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & 
Steiner, 2003; Stromer-Galley, 2007). First, these de-
vices typically connect deliberative quality to explicit 
reason-giving. However, one could easily imagine high-
quality expert deliberations taking place in a rather im-
plicit fashion on the basis of common expert knowledge. 
In cases where non-expert deliberations would perhaps 
profit from explicit discourse to enlighten the subject, 
expert deliberations are already relatively enlightened 
and would rather improve by sidestepping some rounds 
of reason-giving and move on to deliberations on more 
sophisticated claims. Explicitness as an indicator of the 
epistemic quality of expert deliberations is thus dubious 
since the correlation with high expert knowledge influ-
ence on deliberations (i.e. variable 1) is possibly nega-
tive, and at least highly variable. Secondly, these coding 
devices do not distinguish clearly between the epistem-
ic, respect and inclusion dimensions, and as far as they 
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do, they seem to focus more on respect and inclusion. It 
is, however, likely that these dimensions contribute in 
somewhat different directions, in that high scores for 
standard respect and inclusion variables such as partici-
pation and respect for the demands that are raised, are 
not necessarily epistemically optimal (our variable 2).  
Compared with the literature on deliberative de-
mocracy, science and technology studies concentrate 
more specifically on expert behaviour and expertise in-
stitutionalisation (see for example Galison & Stump, 
1996; Jasanoff, 1995, 2007, 2012; Latour, 1987, 2004). 
However, the focus is not really on our variables 1) and 
2), since this branch of studies typically concentrates on 
how actual developments in the fields of knowledge, 
science and expertise (what is accepted as “scientific”, 
scientific practice, the outcomes of controversies among 
scientists and experts etc.) are shaped by other factors 
than level of expertise and epistemic performance—
such as historical path-dependencies, competition be-
tween incommensurable approaches and research 
programs, value-based disagreements, etc. 
This contrasts with literature on the philosophy of 
science, with its continual discussions of epistemic pa-
rameters in science and similar knowledge and truth-
seeking practices. A core concern in the philosophy of 
science canon from the logical positivists of the Vienna-
circle, the “falsificationism” and “critical rationalism” of 
Karl Popper (1963) and onwards (for an introduction, 
see Rosenberg, 2011), is to identify more closely what 
it means for scientific knowledge to be “objective”, 
“valid”, “true”, etc. Another strand of thought has its 
origins in classical sociology of knowledge and circles 
around the idea of a “scientific ethos” (for an influential 
articulation see Robert Merton’s (1973) CUDOS-norms, 
“communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and or-
ganized scepticism”). These two traditions, together 
with ideas of the constitutive norms of “the community 
of inquirers”, originate in part in the pragmatist tradi-
tion, from Charles Sanders Peirce to John Dewey (con-
trast here Apel, 1994; Haack, 1993 with Rorty, 1982, 
1991). They also owe something to the liberal tradition, 
not least the works of John Stuart Mill, and are the 
backdrop of more recent philosophy of science contribu-
tions focused on spelling out criteria of good science. 
Such theories also link up to the notion of deliberation 
and theories of deliberative democracy (Kitcher, 2001, 
2011; Longino, 2002, see also Anderson, 1995a, 1995b). 
However, what is lacking even in these recent con-
tributions is a proper understanding of how epistemic 
parameters and standards of good expert behaviour 
transform when we move from science to politics. This 
is reflected in the overlooking of our variables 3) and 
4), the extent to which expert deliberations in political 
processes are focused on politically relevant and appli-
cable knowledge and competent in its dealings with 
moral concerns and questions of standard setting. The 
approach of Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011) is illustrative. 
For our purposes, it is promising that Kitcher connects 
epistemic quality to collective practices of deliberation 
and to the fulfilment of norms and standards of such 
practices.1 Furthermore, he denies that questions of 
values and norms are external to scientific practice 
(Kitcher, 2001, pp. 85-92, 2011). Defenders of standard 
ideas of value-freedom in science, from Max Weber 
and Karl Popper to contemporary defenders (see 
Haack, 1993, 2001), typically accept that research 
questions and applications of research should be “val-
ue-relevant” (Weber, 1949) and “significant” (Haack, 
1993), but argue for a “pure” stage of theory testing, or 
“context of justification” (see Reichenbach, 1938), 
where ethical and political considerations have no role. 
Kitcher notes that already on this view, the scientific 
institution needs to be engaged by democratic deliber-
ative processes, since value-laden questions of what to 
do research on and how to apply findings cannot be 
left solely to the scientists (Kitcher, 2001, pp. 117-146). 
This is even more so as the idea of “pure” theory-
testing, fully distinguished from societal values and 
broader standard setting processes, cannot be upheld.2  
Kitcher’s conception of scientific inquiry as part of 
broader deliberative processes no doubt has affinities 
with the deliberative system conception of expert in-
quiries in political processes. However, even if he rec-
ognises that ethical and political considerations are an 
integral part of truth-seeking practices, he has relative-
ly little to say about how to approach such considera-
tions in an epistemically optimal way (our variable 4). 
Furthermore, good epistemic performance in science, 
even in Kitcher’s account of a socially and politically 
embedded science, is not quite the same as good epis-
temic performance when operating as expert in politi-
cal processes, since the latter hinges centrally on an 
orientation towards politically relevant and applicable 
knowledge (our variable 3). Also this falls outside the 
scope of Kitcher’s discussions. 
There is thus a need to supplement existing litera-
ture. The next section will elaborate on our four varia-
bles, relating them conceptually to the idea of expertise 
as a truth-facilitating filter in political processes in order 
to substantiate further why we believe they are central 
to assessments of expert deliberations’ epistemic quality. 
Or to put it differently, if “(t)he epistemic function of a de-
liberative system is to produce preferences, opinions, and 
decisions that are appropriately informed by facts and 
logic and…relevant reasons” (Mansbridge & Parkinson, 
2012, p. 11), what kind of expert deliberations would we 
need, given experts’ particular task to fulfil this function?  
                                                          
1 This distinguishes Kitcher’s works from the philosophy of sci-
ence branch that has attempted to demarcate science from 
non-science based on definitions of particular characteristics of 
propositions and theories. 
2 Kitcher delivers a set of more specific arguments that cannot 
be assessed here. 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 166-178 170 
3. Assessing the Epistemic Quality of Expert 
Deliberations: Four Key Variables 
3.1. Informed by Technical Expertise 
A first major requirement would be that those who are 
referred to or refer to themselves as experts are “real” 
experts and deliberate on the basis of their expertise. 
“Expertise” is both a comparative and a threshold con-
cept: experts are those within a domain that “possess a 
substantial body of truths” and that “have more beliefs 
(or high degrees of belief) in true propositions and/or 
fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain 
than most people do (or better than the vast majority 
of people do)” (Goldman, 2011, p. 15). Experts in short 
know a lot about something and more than most oth-
ers do. The more particular substance of that “some-
thing” will vary immensely between domains—there 
are experts on nanotechnology, on labour market eco-
nomics, on environmental regulation, on international 
trade law, etc. Also, institutional affiliation could very 
well vary: the Commission's expert group members are 
scientists, but also bureaucratic officials with relevant 
regulatory experience, stakeholder representatives and 
“counter expertise” (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008, 2010). 
However, generally, experts relied on in policy and deci-
sion-making are expected to contribute with an extra, 
substantial set of “facts” (Mansbridge & Parkinson, 
2012) or “truths” (Goldman, 2011) on state of affairs and 
effects of interventions. This is often referred to as 
“technical expertise” (Collins & Evans, 2002), and when 
experts are regarded as truth-facilitators in politics, this 
is intimately linked to the belief that their deliberations 
are informed relevantly by such expertise. Our variable 
1) addresses whether this belief is empirically founded. 
3.2. Regulated by Epistemically Optimal Respect and 
Inclusion Norms 
Secondly, for deliberations to be “informed by facts 
and logic” and “relevant reasons”, it seems vital that 
they are regulated by the right kind of respect and in-
clusion norms. Respect and inclusion are also separate 
functions of democratic politics, both with independ-
ent normative value, but the idea of our variable 2) is 
to pinpoint the extent to which expert deliberations 
are regulated by respect and inclusion norms that are 
optimal for fulfilling the epistemic function.  
Good epistemic practice implies a certain morality 
of respect and inclusion (e.g. Robert Merton’s (1973) 
idea of a scientific ethos). A contemporary account is 
given by Helen Longino (2002, pp. 128-135) in her ar-
gument for why inequality in “cognitive authority” is 
compatible with equality in “intellectual authority”: to 
include in conversation everyone with something rea-
sonable and relevant to say, irrespective of their social 
and cultural background, and to assess arguments irre-
spective of who are pursuing them. As Longino notes, 
there is no need to impose this idea of equal intellec-
tual authority and the norms of respect and inclusion 
that follow on good epistemic practice from the out-
side, as this norm set seems to be implied by what it 
means to perform such practices successfully.  
The implicit morality of proper investigation may, in 
concrete cases, imply both “more inclusion” and “more 
respect”. Historically, there are several examples of 
how groups which were previously excluded from this 
or that epistemic practice and regarded as a priori infe-
rior, are at some point included in the practice and 
granted equal intellectual authority for independent 
moral reasons, but also because it serves truth-seeking 
and sound inquiries (Anderson, 1995a, 1995b). Howev-
er, in other cases the result could in fact be “less inclu-
sion” and “less respect”: in epistemically optimal delib-
erations, people can very well end up with being 
excluded and dismissed if their arguments turn out to 
be wrong or irrelevant (Lafont, 2006; Martí, 2006).3 
This is why discourses are typically bounded and partic-
ipation restricted in institutions where obtaining the 
truth is imperative (Alexander, 2005, pp. 128-130). 
Consider legal adjudications (set out to track “right” 
verdicts), but also science: “…professional journals re-
fuse to publish claims that the editors believe are not 
properly substantiated, and faculties and laboratories 
refuse to employ those who hold what in the opinion 
of those faculties and laboratories are outlandish 
views” (Alexander, 2005, p. 128). It can, therefore, be a 
long way from the democratic ethos of inclusion and 
respect for all, in principle irrespective of their epis-
temic contribution, to the inclusion and respect struc-
tures that follows from epistemically optimal delibera-
tions. It is, however, the latter which epistemically-
oriented assessments of deliberations must strive to 
identify and assess, and that our variable 2 seeks to 
address. 
3.3. Focused on Politically Relevant and Applicable 
Knowledge 
Thirdly, truth-seeking in science is often equated with 
truth-seeking proper. However, truth-seeking goes on 
in different institutional contexts, and even if truth-
seeking practices have overlapping features across con-
                                                          
3 There is a tradition going back at least to John Stuart Mill 
which contends that a diversity of arguments and perspectives, 
pursuing investigations and discussions from as large a variety 
of relevant angles as possible, will facilitate better outcomes 
(see also Anderson (2006). Landemore (2011) connects this ar-
gument to more recent “wisdom of crowds research”. This 
draws attention to how democratic inclusion may have instru-
mental merits. This point must however not be confused with 
an argument saying that the broadest possible participation 
always improves on outcomes (Mansbridge & Parkinson, 2012; 
Marti, 2006; Mutz 2006, 2013; Rothstein, 2011). 
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texts, what they include and imply may vary. More 
specifically, our variable 3 reflects the fact that the in-
stitutional goals of science and politics are distinct. 
Whereas the official institutional goal of science is to 
seek valid knowledge, “truth” and “objectivity”, the ul-
timate goal of politics is to reach collectively binding 
decisions. Political decisions ought to be truth-sensitive 
and based on knowledge, “facts and logic” and “rele-
vant reasons” (Mansbridge & Parkinson, 2012), but 
which reasons are relevant or which “truths” are “sig-
nificant” (Haack, 1993) will be shaped and restrained 
by the fact that the truth-seeking is part of a decision-
making process. The knowledge brought forward and 
relied on in the deliberations of democratic politics 
thus needs to be politically relevant and significant; it 
should reflect what is possible and desirable, given 
both relevant political actors’ different preferences and 
assessments of what may be common political goals 
and norms, and what is feasible to implement in prac-
tice (as far as the issues in question raise questions of 
governmental implementation and regulation). From 
an epistemic point of view, this requirement applies to 
all deliberation in politics, and as far as experts are par-
ticularly assigned to optimise epistemic outputs, no 
less to expert deliberations; in this setting political con-
siderations of relevance and applicability are not ex-
ternal (legitimate or illegitimate) curtailments, as when 
deliberations in science adapt to the institutional goals 
of politics, but rather an internal epistemic demand re-
flecting how politics is not science, but a distinct con-
text of collective will-formation and decision-making. 
3.4. Approaching Questions Involving Moral Judgment 
and Standard Setting Competently 
Finally, politics concerns technical issues, but also 
questions about what we ought to do. From an epis-
temic point of view, this raises the question of whether 
there can be such a thing as “moral expertise”, exper-
tise on issues of what ought to be done, in addition to 
what lies within the scope of technical expertise. Kitch-
er articulates a common view when answering “no” 
(see also the classical formulation by Dahl, 1989). In 
the domain of normative questions, we are all, he says, 
equally experts or non-experts, and “our ethical discus-
sions are adequate to the extent that they reach the 
conclusions that would have resulted from an ideal de-
liberation under conditions of mutual engagement” 
(Kitcher, 2011, p. 51).  
But what if a group of trained moral experts are 
able to track these “ideal” conclusions better than any 
non-ideal moral conversation including all, trained and 
untrained in moral thinking and argumentation? This 
possibility spurs Peter Singer (1972, p. 117) to conclude 
that “moral expertise would seem to be possible” in a 
certain sense: “[s]omeone familiar with moral concepts 
and with moral arguments, who has ample time to 
gather information and think about it, may reasonably 
be expected to reach a soundly based conclusion more 
often than someone who is unfamiliar with moral con-
cepts and moral arguments and has little time”. Simi-
larly, John Broome (2012, p. 9) argues that there can 
be moral experts “of a sort”, those who “are practiced 
in accurate reasoning” on moral questions, who “know 
the range of alternative moral ideas that are available”, 
who “know how to subject those ideas to rational test-
ing”, who can “refute bad arguments” in this domain, 
and who have “a trained sensitivity to moral, issues”.4  
Accordingly, a fourth key variable in assessment of 
expert deliberations’ epistemic quality is whether, and 
the extent to which, normative questions are ap-
proached competently. Arguments of democratic re-
spect and inclusion speak in favour of leaving the moral 
issues that may occur in such deliberations to citizens 
or their representatives, and as suggested by Dahl, 
Kitcher and others, epistemic concerns lead in the 
same direction, as long as there is no moral expertise 
among the deliberators. However, as far such “sort of” 
expertise is available, the epistemic quality of expert 
deliberations would depend on whether and how it is 
used. Moral expertise could here refer to a special 
competence in conceptualising and elaborating the 
meaning of norms, values and ends involved, expiring 
the implications of pursuing this or that end or of de-
fining this or that value in one way or another, explor-
ing normative conflicts and the consequences of such 
conflicts, etc. We could, however, also think of moral 
experts that enter “the kingdom of ends” and discuss 
the justifiability of norms and political aims, and of dif-
ferent interpretations, priorities and the balancing of 
normative ideas and ideals. A “justice expert” may ar-
gue that this or that is the appropriate metric of dis-
tributive justice and then suggest a principle of just dis-
tribution, say of health care, or may tell us that this or 
that is the reasonable way to approach conflicts be-
tween rights.  
4. The Epistemic Quality of Deliberation in European 
Commission Expert Groups: Do Researchers Investi-
gate It—And Can They? 
4.1. Existing Studies of European Commission Experts—
Do They Evaluate Epistemic Performance? 
From a legitimacy perspective, it is, as we have argued, 
essential to investigate experts’ epistemic performance 
and the quality of their deliberations—and we have 
now elaborated on a set of variables that seems deci-
sive. Looking at the case of the European Commission's 
use of external expertise and the institutionalisation of 
a formalised expert group system—currently consisting 
                                                          
4 Obviously, moral experts in this sense do not necessarily 
themselves act in morally superior ways. 
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of 1575 groups (European Commission, n. d.)—it seems 
that existing studies have only sporadically touched 
upon this issue.  
One branch of previous research clearly relates to 
questions of legitimacy. Mark Rhinard (2002) is as-
sessing “the democratic legitimacy” of the EU commit-
tee system, Commission expert groups included, and 
looks at whether decision-making is 1) transparent in 
terms of who makes the decisions and which societal 
issues are at stake; 2) deliberative, allowing “different 
conceptions of the public interest” into the process and 
giving them “a fair and thoughtful hearing”; and 3) ac-
countable, meaning that citizens have control over the 
policy-making system. Julia Metz (2014) has a similar 
ambition, concentrating on expert groups and applying 
Fritz Scharpf’s (1999) concept of output legitimacy, a 
legitimacy standard that “demands effective problem 
solving, but also policy solutions to be in the public in-
terest” (Metz, 2014, p. 268). Metz goes on focusing on 
the latter aspect and argues that expert groups are not 
open enough to achieve a suitable balance between ef-
fectiveness and inclusiveness. Finally, Åse Gornitzka 
and Ulf Sverdrup (2010, p. 2) “map out the scale of in-
volvement of scientists” in expert groups, and even if 
they do not explicitly “engage in any discussion of the 
appropriate level of scientific involvement” and “the 
potential democratic gains and losses of such involve-
ment”, they believe their study provides a crucial “fac-
tual basis” for such assessments. 
A shared characteristic of these contributions is 
how they connect the legitimacy of the expert groups 
primarily to the extent of their democratic inclusive-
ness, not to the expert group members’ epistemic per-
formance. Rhinard (2002) and Metz (2014) both pro-
vide insights into aspects of how the experts 
deliberate, and, arguably, touches upon our variables 
2, 3 and 4; whether and how “public interest” is in-
cluded relates both to the political relevance and ap-
plicability of the deliberations, the level of competence 
in the handling of standard setting, and the question of 
epistemically optimal inclusion, whereas giving argu-
ments “a thoughtful hearing” could be described as a 
truth-facilitating respect norm. The relevance here is, 
however, indirect and vague, as there is no question of 
a systematic focus of the epistemic merits of the expert 
group members’ deliberations, and variable 1 is not 
addressed at all. 
Another category of existing studies looks at 
knowledge utilisation and whether the Commission’s 
use of expertise has a primarily problem-solving func-
tion or rather more strategic functions. Typically, such 
studies do not look specifically at expert group mem-
bers and other experts’ behaviour, but at how 
knowledge is perceived and utilised by the Commission 
for policy-making (see for example Boswell, 2008). 
There are also contributions including analyses of ex-
perts’ perceptions and their role that shed some light 
on our research question, but this is not the main issue 
(Metz, 2013). A recent study systematically maps per-
ceptions among scientists in expert groups of how the 
Commission employs scientific knowledge (Rimkute & 
Haverland, 2014), but our variable 1 - whether such 
knowledge influences the experts’ own deliberations, 
and the general question of how the experts them-
selves perform - is not addressed.  
There are in addition other single studies of the 
Commission’s expert groups, such as Torbjörn Larsson 
and Jarle Trondal's (2006) investigation into the Com-
mission’s organisation of the agenda-setting of policy-
making, including the role of experts and consultative 
groups, but the focus here is on how to explain organi-
sational and institutional features, rather than on how 
groups and group members perform according to cog-
nitive criteria. Another sociologically-oriented study 
analyses expert group members’ social resources and 
overlapping career trajectories as constitutive for 
common experiences and aspirations (Robert, 2010), 
but is silent on how this may affect their performance 
as proper experts. 
4.2. Why Not Check the Quality of Experts’ Deliberation? 
Methodological and Other Interpretations 
We have to conclude that interest in our research ques-
tion has thus far been highly limited; what we have 
found constitutes only a few studies with some indirect 
relevance for some of our variables. This (non-)finding 
could have several explanations. On some level, it may 
be an expression of relativist trends in the academic 
community, a belief that it is hard, even impossible, to 
distinguish better from worse, right from wrong, true 
from false. To study whether expert deliberations have 
epistimically optimal or even truth-facilitating charac-
teristics, does presuppose some idea of “truth”, or at 
least a notion of deliberation as having stronger or 
weaker epistemic merits, and if the latter is denied, 
studies of the kind we have been looking for here do 
not seem to make much sense. Alternatively, what we 
are witnessing reflects, not necessarily blatant relativ-
ism, but an attempt to remain politically neutral, and a 
sceptical attitude among researchers to utilising re-
search in order to address questions of EU legitimacy 
and other such questions enmeshed in political contro-
versy. But as the review above has showed, it is not re-
ally the case that those investigating the Commission’s 
expert groups generally shy away from controversial is-
sues or evaluative undertakings. What is missing is the 
particular evaluative undertaking of studying whether 
experts operate epistemically as they are supposed to. 
Another reason could simply be that there still are 
so few studies on the Commission’s expert groups; 
maybe the studies we are looking for are yet to come. 
However, so far, a research question that, from a legit-
imacy perspective at least, is highly urgent, has seem-
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ingly been given no priority whatsoever. This adds, 
moreover, to similar trends in other branches of rele-
vant research (see Section 2).  
A third interpretation may be that there is some-
thing wrong with our legitimacy analysis and that the 
cognitive quality of experts’ deliberations and perfor-
mance is not such a decisive topic after all. That this is 
the case, is, however, hardly controversial; as indicat-
ed, the idea of expertise as a truth-facilitating “filter” is 
well-established in theoretical discussions of normative 
legitimacy. This more ideal role of expertise is also as-
sumed in empirical literature, for example in standard 
outlines of the official problem-solving function of ex-
pertise, and indeed by the Commission itself when it 
spells out principles and guidelines for the proper or-
ganisation and use of expert advice (see for example 
European Commission, 2002, pp. 9-10; European 
Commission, 2010, p. 10). 
Our focus will therefore be on a fourth interpreta-
tion, namely that there may be methodological chal-
lenges, or perceived methodological challenges that 
make our research question hard or even impossible to 
investigate. Methodological literature on how to study 
elite behaviour often focuses on two obstacles, the ac-
cess problem and the bias problem (see for example 
Harvey, 2011; Ostrander, 1993). As members of the 
knowledge elite, experts can be hard to access. Time is 
a scare resource, and people in elite positions typically 
have a lot scheduled. Elites may also have an interest in 
turning down requests from researchers in cases 
where publicity could spur criticism. In cases where 
they have an interest in going public, they may have a 
range of channels for doing so, and do not need a re-
searcher to speak up for them. The bias problem ap-
plies in studies of elites and none-elites alike, insofar as 
people are more interested in “looking good” than in 
providing the researcher with accurate information. 
However, an extra bias problem tends to occur in stud-
ies of elites, as elite informants typically perform above 
average as communicators and self-presenters, and are 
thus more effective in getting other people to buy into 
their world view. This is a challenge for research that 
aims not only to capture what elites say they do, but 
also what they actually do.  
There are, however, additional methodological 
challenges. For one thing, our focus is specific; the 
question is not how expert group members behave and 
think in general, but how they deliberate. Not all data 
and methods are equally adequate for this purpose. 
More importantly, there is a key problem of epistemic 
asymmetry between experts and non-experts: non-
experts often lack the ability to assess experts’ argu-
ments, explanations and judgments directly. This prob-
lem, referred to in social epistemology literature as 
“the layperson-expert problem” (Goldman, 2011), is of-
ten highlighted as an obstacle when citizens try to hold 
experts to democratic account, but is potentially also a 
grand obstacle when non-experts do research on ex-
perts, at least when the aim is, as in our case, to assess 
the experts’ epistemic performance. It is hard to assess 
whether technical expertise, be it on medical technolo-
gy, environmental law or agriculture, influence experts’ 
deliberations (our variable 1), or whether a complex 
argument of distributive justice or moral responsibility 
is competently pursued (our variable 4) when the per-
son making the assessment lacks this kind of technical 
and moral expertise. This or that may appear to be an 
“expert” contribution, but if you are a non-expert, how 
could you know? 
In the next section, we will discuss the persuasive-
ness of these four methodological challenges when 
studying the epistemic performance of the Commission 
expert group experts. Is it likely that access and bias 
problems make researchers shy away from this line of 
research? Is the problem our specific focus on delibera-
tion? Or is the key factor rather the deeper underlying 
problem of epistemic asymmetry? 
4.3. Data Adequacy and Methodological Challenges 
There seem to be, roughly speaking, four ways to ap-
proach a study into the Commission’s expert groups.5 
First, there is available background data on the groups 
in the Register of Commission Expert Groups, an online 
register of all groups that include information on policy 
area, responsible DG, mission/mandate, characteristics 
of individual members, etc. More background data, for 
example on the group members’ careers, could be col-
lected and systematised along similar lines. Secondly, 
there is the possibility of asking the experts themselves 
about their thinking and behaviour, interviewing them, 
or making surveys. Thirdly, there are public documents. 
Most of the groups publish meeting minutes or activity 
reports, and some produce also additional reports and 
policy documents. The Commission has also produced a 
set of documents on expertise and consultation policies, 
expert group guidelines, etc. (see European Commis-
sion, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2010a, 2010b), in addition to 
what may be of more specific policy documents with 
relevance for particular expert groups depending on 
mandate and policy field. Lastly, there is the opportunity 
to study the groups through observing their meetings. 
A first obstacle may be our specific focus on delib-
eration. Experts could be asked in interviews or surveys 
about the qualities of their group deliberations, and 
background data could be used as a rough proxy for 
likely deliberative qualities, assuming for example that 
                                                          
5 Experimental design has been important in establishing cog-
nitive psychology findings on biases in how experts think (see 
for example Kahneman, 2011; Mercier, 2011). However, we 
are not interested in how experts think and interact in general, 
but in how a particular set of experts in EU policy-making be-
have.  
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groups dominated by scientists are more likely to have 
deliberations influenced by relevant technical expertise 
and epistemically optimal respect and inclusion norms. 
An indicator such as the latter would, however, be 
highly indirect, and potentially substantial variation in 
actual epistemic performance among the groups would 
be swept under the carpet. With regard to interviews 
and surveys, there is the possibility of low response 
rates, in addition to the bias problem: that this line of 
research tell us more about how Commission expert 
group members perceive their deliberations and want 
others to perceive them, than about how they actually 
deliberate. Observation of group meetings would be a 
more direct and seemingly safer way of capturing the 
latter; access problems could occur, but standard bias 
problems would more or less disappear. In addition, 
documentary sources, from minute meetings to re-
ports and policy documents produced by the groups, 
would most likely contain potential relevant infor-
mation on both knowledge basis (variable 1), norms 
of discussions and inquiry (variable 2), policy rele-
vance (variable 3), and the qualities of normative ar-
gumentation (variable 4). Once more, there could, 
however, be problematic discrepancies between how 
deliberative qualities and epistemic performance are 
reported in various documents and the actual quali-
ties of deliberations. The persuasiveness of bias prob-
lems would depend on the level of document quality 
and report accuracy. 
Consequently, despite the well-known access and 
bias problems of elite studies and the specific focus on 
deliberation, the study of our four variables seem to 
be, if not a straightforward endeavour, within reach 
providing researchers utilise a combination of observa-
tion and documentary analysis. There is, however, the 
additional obstacle of epistemic asymmetry which 
seems to be pervasive across data and methods. Stud-
ies based on observation, for example, may eschew ac-
cess and bias problems, and seem perfect when the 
study object is how experts deliberate, but the prob-
lem of how researchers of expert deliberation—who 
more often than not are non-experts in the domains 
where these experts are experts—can assess the epis-
temic quality of these experts’ performance remains. 
The problem is perhaps most obvious in the cases of 
variable 1 and 4: it can be hard to distinguish sophisti-
cated knowledge from what seems to be sophisticated, 
advanced competence from what is only seemingly ad-
vanced, unless you yourself are an expert. The very 
same difficulty will, however, also easily occur when 
non-experts try to assess whether the knowledge 
which experts rely on and produce through their delib-
erations is politically relevant and applicable (variable 3). 
To evaluate the political significance, adequacy and ap-
plicability of proposals and recommendations of what to 
do can be hard if you lack substantive insight in the 
knowledge basis of the proposals/recommendations in 
question and the normative issues involved. The same 
goes for the identification of epistemically optimal re-
spect and inclusion norms (variable 2). To determine 
which deliberators and arguments belong in truth-
facilitating deliberations on this or that topic, and who 
and what should be filtered out, will often require both 
substantive technical expert knowledge and extensive 
standard-setting competence.  
As far as there are methodological obstacles hold-
ing investigators back, it seems, therefore, that the real 
problem and the elephant in the room is the problem 
of epistemic asymmetry. It figures not as a standard 
problem in methodological literature on elite research, 
but in studies of knowledge elites, at least when as-
sessments of epistemic performance is involved, it 
seems to take effect at a very basic level.  
5. Strategies for Research 
The question is how to get research on experts’ epis-
temic performance going under such conditions. In this 
paper we have explained why concerns of political in-
stitutions’ legitimacy make it imperative for research to 
investigate experts’ epistemic performance; we have 
focused on experts’ deliberations; elaborated on four 
key variables; and discussed whether the lack of atten-
tion to our research question and these variables in ex-
isting research on the Commission’s expert groups, can 
be due to unsurpassable methodological obstacles. Is it 
in effect impossible, or at least too difficult, to do the 
research we ideally ought to be doing? The last sec-
tion’s discussion of available data, their merits and lim-
its, makes it clear that the layperson-expert problem is 
not only an accountability problem, but also a general 
methodological problem for research on how 
knowledge elites perform. Future research and meth-
odological discussions should focus more consistently 
on how to get around it. 
We end this paper, therefore, by sketching five 
strategies for further exploration in such discussions, 
with a focus on the first and fourth of our listed varia-
bles; as suggested in the previous section, if epistemic 
asymmetries make it hard to determine scores on 1 
and 4, they are likely to complicate research on 2 and 3 
as well.  
The first strategy would be to increase one’s ex-
pertise and competence in relevant domains. Harry 
Collins and Robert Evans (2007) distinguish between 
the ability to “contribute” in a domain of technical 
expertise (“contributory expertise”), and to have 
enough competence in this domain to be able to 
make sense of what its contributory experts are say-
ing and doing (“interactional expertise”). In most cas-
es the aim cannot be to diminish epistemic asym-
metry: typically, high levels of interactional expertise 
will not abolish the layperson-expert problem, but it 
can very well reduce it. High levels of interactional 
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expertise in combination with training in normative 
reasoning can also contribute to increased moral compe-
tence and levels of moral expertise.  
The second strategy is to reduce the problem of ep-
istemic asymmetry by picking cases of expert delibera-
tion where the initial asymmetry is low or limited, for 
example deliberations in domains that are close or not 
too far from one’s own domain of expertise, or expert 
groups with mandates that are fairly non-technical, do 
not raise complex questions of standard-setting, etc. in 
order to increase the likelihood that one understands 
the substance of what is going on.  
Thirdly, a negative approach could be taken and ex-
pert group discourse investigated through documents 
or by way of observation in search of what is certainly 
not expertise. Examples here would be exchanges of 
polite phrases or other trivial types of discussion with-
out any substantive claims being made about the ques-
tions at hand, or deliberations that are off topic. Natu-
rally, this strategy is helpful only in identifying expert 
deliberations that are clearly not expertise-based, and 
cannot be employed in harder cases to distinguish be-
tween the genuine expert and the amateur or quasi-
expert dressing up as an “expert”. However, in actual 
empirical studies it can be a relevant first step. 
A fourth strategy is to look at facets of the delibera-
tions that are likely to indicate epistemic quality and 
that even non-experts could assess. An example with 
relevance for variable 1 is explicit expressions of epis-
temic modesty, when deliberators draw attention to 
the limits of their expertise; where their competence 
ends, what is still unknown or uncertain, what other 
experts might disagree with, etc. An example with rel-
evance for variable 4 is the extent to which delibera-
tors make explicit attempts to distinguish between 
technical considerations and value-based assessments; 
singling out the latter to put them aside, deliberating 
on both, but separately, etc. 
A fifth strategy would be to identify and investigate 
promising extra-deliberative indicators of deliberative 
quality. Background data could be searched through to 
single out experts with the right credentials and merits 
for the task. Questionnaires sent to expert group 
members or qualitative interviews consciously de-
signed to minimise the bias problem could be used to 
trace epistemic attitudes. Document analysis in combi-
nation with interviews of relevant Commission officials 
could shed light on epistemic parameters in selection 
and recruitment procedures.  
It should be noted that these strategies are not 
meant to be mutually exclusive. Rather, combining 
them could contribute to increased validity. The aim, 
moreover, has not been to provide research strategies 
that make epistemic asymmetry as methodological 
challenge in studies of knowledge elites vanish. We be-
lieve our approach is promising, but also that the chal-
lenge it addresses is persistent and specific cases could 
easily occur. Due to their lack of contributory expertise, 
non-expert researchers could misperceive their level of 
interactional expertise (i.e. the first strategy), assume 
that the initial epistemic asymmetry is more limited 
than it is (i.e. the second strategy), identify a sequence 
of non-trivial expert exchange as trivial phrases (i.e. the 
third strategy), etc. In the end, the ultimate test of the 
viability of our proposed strategies is the extent to 
which they may inspire high quality empirical research. 
Obviously, for this to happen, more detailed work on 
research questions, operationalisation and methodo-
logical design is needed.  
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